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INTRODUCTION
Copyright laws are written and enforced to help certain groups of
people, largely male, assert and retain control over the resources
generated by creative productivity. Consequently, the copyright
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infrastructure plays a role, largely unexamined by legal scholars, in
helping to sustain the material and economic inequality between
women and men.
Female creative output commands less attention and less money
than the creative works of men, and women are less visible and receive
less compensation than their male counterparts when they collaborate
in the production of creative works with men. Male writers, male
singers, male visual artists, male actors, male directors, male
producers, male composers, male architects, and male authors of
almost any form of copyrightable work dominate the cultural terrain
and thereby acquire and control a substantial majority of the financial
resources that creative works accrue.1
Copyright laws formulate and regulate the distribution channels
through which copyrighted works are exploited. Whether authors,
intermediaries, and consumers are treated fairly, or treat each other
fairly, is partly a function of copyright laws. Copyright laws, therefore,
have an impact upon whether women are treated superior to, inferior
to, or equal to men in copyright-related contexts. Identification of
some of the specific issues that exist at the intersection of gender,
feminism, and copyright law is the focus of this article.
Many of the professionally prominent, active legal scholars in the
intellectual property subject areas, those whose publications obtain
high numbers of citations and receive the most numerous and
prestigious speaking engagements (citations and conference
invitations being important metrics for gauging reputation and
prestige), do not explicitly address issues of gender, race, or economic
class in their scholarship very frequently.2 While concepts of liberty,
1. To confirm this point, the author asks readers to look at the “best seller” lists
for books, music, and listen to which artists are in heavy rotation on commercial
radio. Look at what male actors earn versus female actors, look at who wrote the plays
that are produced on Broadway. Look at who wins the Academy Awards in almost
every category. Look at who wins architectural awards. Look at who works in
Hollywood—directors, even camera operators. Look at the masthead of every major
newspaper or magazine. See generally Who Makes the News?, Global Media
Monitoring Project 2005, at http://www.whomakesthenews.org (promoting fair
gender portrayal in news in an effort to make it the professional standard);
http://www.seejane.org (noting that girls aged 12 to 15 are more likely than boys to
have a mobile phone, use the internet, listen to the radio, and read newspapers or
magazines).
2. This is a broad generalization to which there are important exceptions. Out
of concern that I might omit or mischaracterize a person or her work, I respectfully
decline to list specific names or scholarly works here beyond those listed in some of
the footnotes immediately following this one, but I am certainly aware of, and very
pleased about, their existence. I have previously written about gender and
intellectual property issues in: Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy,
Propertization and Gender, 34 U.S.F.L. REV. 633, 676 (2000) (arguing that
individuals should have property rights to their own personal information); Ann
Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 799 (2004) (discussing
how commodification of the stereotypical “very easily confused female consumer”
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equality, and social justice are certainly discussed, it is often through
lenses of economic analyses that rely on gender, sexual orientation,
economic class, and race-neutral assumptions about human behavior.
Happily, some established legal scholars are writing about issues
such as the intersections between intellectual property and issues of
gender, sexual orientation, and race,3 and other more junior legal
academics are making important contributions to this discourse as
well.4 This is an exciting and important development that reflects
both a maturation of scholarly trends within the intellectual property
subject areas and the fresh diversities of thought that the intellectual
property related subject areas inspire. The substantial bodies of
foundational doctrinal work in copyright, patent, and trademark law
now in existence make more adventurous scholarship both possible
affects judicial perceptions in trademark disputes); Ann Bartow, Women in the Web
of Secondary Copyright Liability and Internet Filtering, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 449, 481-82
(2005) (calling for greater scrutiny of how copyright laws and the policing of
cyberspace fail to take into account female needs and perspectives in the online
world).
3. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media (Minn.
Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 05-12), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=692029
(discussing conflicts between current copyright law and feminist conceptions of
hypertext); see also Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Digital Bowdlerizing: Removing the
Naughty Bytes, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 198-99 (concluding that copyright laws do
not prohibit the alteration of digital works to remove offensive content); Llewellyn
Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and the Disparaging:
Section 2(A) Trademark Law After Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
187, 223 (2005) (challenging the use of current trademark law to reject “queer
marks”); Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and
Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 101 (1993) (advocating the use of copyright and
patent law to facilitate the production of and deployment of knowledge into an
accessible commons of information); Keith Aoki, Considering Multiple and
Overlapping Sovereignties: Liberalism, Libertarianism, National Sovereignty, “Global”
Intellectual Property, and the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 443, 461- (1998)
(discussing the ways in which the globalization of U.S. intellectual property law
expands the rights of domestic intellectual property owners); Anupam Chander &
Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1356
(2004) (stressing that the unregulated public domain perpetuates global inequities);
Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property and Identity Politics: Playing with Fire, 4 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 69, 75 (2000) (arguing against treating cultural identity as
intellectual property and showing how claims of a right to Indian culture were used in
an attempt to censor a film on Indian lesbianism).
4. See Sonya K. Katyal, Performance, Property, and the Slashing of Gender in
Fan Fiction, 14 Am. U. J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 463 (2006); see also Timothy R.
Holbrook, Curing Heterosexuality? Moral Signals and the Potential for Expressive
Impacts in Patent Law 1 (Apr. 11, 2005) (unpublished article, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=702587) (asserting that the
patenting of genes linked to homosexuality encourages the discrimination and
marginalization of gays and lesbians); Olufunmilayo Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip
Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006);
Olufunmilayo Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Control and Compensation in Porgy
and Bess (Case Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-3, 2005), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667385; K.J. Greene, Copyright,
Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 339, 356-359 (1999) (examining how the structure of copyright laws has operated
to deny legal protection to black artists and musicians).
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and, to some of us, greatly appealing.
The purpose of this article is to identify some of the gendered
aspects of copyright law and suggest some feminist perspectives about
them. The aim of the identification portion of the project is to create
a list of gendered issues in copyright law with a reasonable degree of
balance and objectivity. The goal of the feminist analysis, however, is
decidedly normative.5 The view asserted here is that important
feminist principles are most harmonious with a “low barriers”6
construction of copyright law. As a result, this article argues that low
protectionism is the vision of copyright law that feminists should
actively pursue. Not all feminists and/or copyright law scholars
contemplating feminist legal theory are going to agree with this
conclusion, and the author very much looks forward to reading or
hearing and learning from their contrary views sometime in the
future.
I. GENDER AND COPYRIGHT LAW
Many substantive bodies of law have fairly obvious gendered
aspects. Criminal law as a subject area encompasses gendered
categories of offenses such as rape and domestic abuse; employment
law includes gender and pregnancy discrimination and sexual
harassment; and family law, with its focus on issues such as alimony,
child support, child custody, divorce, and property division, has few
doctrinal components that are not deeply linked to gendered
characteristics and differences. These are merely a few of the most
palpable examples.
Other legal subject areas have gendered issues that are somewhat
less manifest on the surface, but still unmistakably present. Legal
scholars have aptly demonstrated that less intuitively gendered areas,
5. Other scholarly works advancing feminist views of copyrights include: Shelley
Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J. WOMEN & L.
59, 63 (1994) (examining how the notion of “reproduction” in copyright illustrates
inherent gender biases); Deborah Halbert, Poaching and Plagiarizing: Property,
Plagiarism and Feminist Futures, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN A POSTMODERN WORLD 111, 113 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999)
(describing early forms of copyright law as based on a male conception of authorship
as “paternity” that excluded women from authority and authorship); ROSEMARY J.
COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP,
APPROPRIATION AND THE LAW 28-29 (1998) (examining the role of intellectual property
law in the creation of cultural politics, identity, and difference); KEMBREW MCLEOD,
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: OVERZEALOUS COPYRIGHT BOZOS AND OTHER ENEMIES OF
CREATIVITY 270-78 (2005) (arguing that privatization and the over-use of intellectual
property and copyright laws threatens free-speech and suppresses creativity); Burk,
supra note 3.
6. See Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More
Like a Book, 43 VILL. L. REV. 13 (2003) (defining low barriers as relatively weak
copyright protection).
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such as tax law7 and bankruptcy law8, also have components or cause
outcomes that affect women and men disparately. Similarly, copyright
law is an area in which gendered issues seem somewhat buried
beneath a very complicated statute and dense body of case law.
Excavation of the intersections between gender and copyright law will
foster a richer understanding of copyrights and may generate
significant policy recommendations and reconsiderations as well.
Copyright laws began as implements of censorship and remain tools
by which the cost, availability, and, to some extent, even the existence
of creative works such as songs, novels, movies, and paintings are
controlled.9 Copyright laws in the United States allocate dominion
over creative works in seemingly gender-neutral ways, facially
appearing to uniformly affect the creators and consumers of
copyrightable works without regard to the sexes of the interested
parties.10 Yet cultural understandings of the purposes and strictures
of copyright may measurably diverge across gender and promulgation
and enforcement of actual copyright laws may have differential effects
upon women and men. Consideration of these possibilities will
enhance understandings of the overall fairness (or lack thereof) of
the current copyright infrastructure.
The necessity and propriety of the current copyright legal regime is
passionately contested for reasons rhetorically unrelated to genderbased inequities. Advocates of the “high barriers”11 copyright scope
tout the tremendous profitability of the music, television, motion
7. See generally Nancy J. Knauer, Heteronormativity and Federal Tax Policy, 101
W. VA. L. REV. 129, 133-34 (1998) (applying queer theory to critical tax scholarship
and examining the way tax laws affect same-sex couples); Collected Papers of Marjorie
Kornhauser, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_
id=22192 (last visited July 26, 2006).
8. See Elizabeth Warren, What Is a Women's Issue? Bankruptcy, Commercial
Law, and Other Gender-Neutral Topics, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 56 (2002)
(asserting that bankruptcy law is a woman’s issue and examining how bankruptcy
legislation profoundly effects women’s lives); see also Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for
Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of Loss, 47 VAND. L. REV. 427, 439
(1994) (applying economic theory to create a model for allocating the costs of
preventing sexual harassment between employer and employee); Karen Gross, ReVision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REV.
1506, 1553 (1990) (describing bankruptcy law as a phallocentric creation that
perpetuates poverty among women).
9. See Pamela Samuelson, Should Economics Play A Role in Copyright Law and
Policy?, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 3, 20 (2004) (concluding that even though
copyright is an important form of economic regulation, economic analysis should
have more influence on copyright law and policy).
10. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2005) (providing definitions that
are carefully gender neutral, such as referring to “a person’s ‘children’” and defining
an author’s “widow” or “widower” as “the author's surviving spouse under the law of
the author's domicile at the time of his or her death, whether or not the spouse has
later remarried”).
11. Contra Bartow, supra note 6.
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picture, and publishing industries as evidence of the positive
economic impact of powerful copyright protections.12 They assert
that acts of creation and distribution generate powerful intellectual
property rights that the law should recognize, respect, and defend, so
that the appropriate, deserving actors are fully compensated, and
future works are adequately incentivized.
Critics of strong protectionism question whether the copyright laws
allocate profits and controls in ways that maximize incentives to create
and distribute new works13 and note that enforceable copyrights may

12. See NOW: Judicial Review 2 (PBS television broadcast, June 17, 2005)
available at http://www.pbs.org/now/ transcript/NOW124_full.html; NOW with Bill
Moyers: Tollbooths on the Digital Highway (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 17, 2003),
available at http://www.pbs.org/now/printable/transcript_copyright_print.html
(quoting Jack Valenti’s statement on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of
America that, “if what creative people produce cannot be protected . . . then the
victim is going to be the American republic and the inevitability of a lessened supply
of a high quality expensive high budget material”); see also Jane C. Ginsburg,
Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1619 (2001) (arguing that tighter author control over copyrighted works will
result in increased quantity and quality of work produced); Jane C. Ginsburg, How
Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 61, 73 (2003) (predicting
that enhanced copyright protection creates an environment which will encourage the
digital release and dissemination of works); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright)
in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 260 (discussing how stronger copyright
protections through the institution of private property regimes would result in
greater savings for society through a reduction in transaction costs); R. Polk Wagner,
Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of Control,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1013 (2003) (asserting that profit motives may overwhelm
normative limitations on intellectual property); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S
HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (2003).
13. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 14-15 (2001) (advocating that
constraints on “real space” creativity are no longer justified for Internet); see also
JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 14 (2001) (“The fact that technology enables
copyright owners to exercise more complete control is no reason to modify the
copyright law to facilitate it”); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS:
THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 182-84 (2001)
(stating that a “leaky system” of copyright best enables users to benefit from cultural
proliferation while a reckless construction of copyright laws can lead to censorship);
Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1314-18 (1996) (advocating “low
barriers” for copyright protection in the domestic context); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright
and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1089, 1142-43 (1998)
(noting that copyright law authorizes too much intrusion into the privacy of
individuals and that proposed provisions would threaten constitutionally proscribed
limits of copyright protection); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1819 (2000) (concluding that a greater understanding of the
creative process is essential for the creation of effective copyright protections);
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55,
64-65 (2001) (taking a skeptical view of the social value of price discrimination and
arguing that the reward for producers should be limited to an amount adequate to
stimulate the creation of future work); Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or OverPriced Free Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause
in the Public's Control of Government, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2000) (arguing that
intellectual property clause should be able to control government's ability to bypass
financial scrutiny); Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Music Copyrights, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673 (2003); Samuelson, supra note 9.
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actually be unnecessary for the flourishing of whole categories of
creative endeavor.14 They observe that the computer software
industry, and many of the technologies underlying the Internet,
developed without receiving much in the way of legally enforced
monopolistic controls.15 Similarly, clothing designs and cooking
recipes do not generally receive copyright protection, and yet we do
not go naked and hungry, nor do we typically observe or experience
vacuums of creativity with respect to fashion or food.16
Vigorous disagreements about the proper societal role and scope of
copyright laws have made copyright law a high-profile matter of
public debate but without much explicit acknowledgement or
discussion of embedded gender-related aspects. That does not mean
that gender-based dissonance is not present or that it is not
significant.
Copyright laws may be undesirable and
counterproductive in gendered contexts because they are likely to
impede creativity by women rather than incentivizing it and to
obstruct rather than facilitate the broad distribution of creative works
and useful knowledge to women.17
Copyright laws were written by men to embody a male vision of the
ways in which creativity and commerce should intersect. Whether this
model of copyright serves women as well as men has not been a
primary consideration of policy makers, if it has even been
contemplated at all. Men dominate Congress and the federal
judiciary, as well as the large-scale, copyright-holding enterprises that
interact with, and have the ability to influence, the federal
14. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction Of Copyright:
Napster and the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 295300 (2002) (examining the distribution of online music and suggesting that copyright
impedes creativity and is unnecessary for digital works); JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS,
SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY
(1996); see also VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13, at 180 (discussing the positive effect
of MP3 distribution and peer-to-peer networks on creative musical discourse); see also
COOMBE, supra note 5, at 290-91 (explaining what makes a political community
common and how that community can enable the creation of literary discourse).
15. See id.
16. See LITMAN, supra note 13, at 105-106; see also Malla Pollack, A Rose is a Rose
is a Rose – But is a Costume a Dress? An Alternative Solution in Whimsicality, Inc. v.
Rubie’s Costume Co., 41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 16-17 (1993) (evaluating the
use of copyright law to protect costume designs); Malla Pollack, Note, Intellectual
Property Protection for the Creative Chef, or How to Copyright a Cake: A Modest
Proposal, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1477, 1479 (1991) (proposing the extension of
copyright protections to food in order to encourage consumers to share recipes).
17. See Carol M. Rose, Bargaining and Gender, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 547,
548-62 (1995) (applying bargaining games to explain the different allocation of assets
across gender in terms of real or culturally perceived differences in preferences for
cooperative strategic behavior); cf. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and
Losing Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 424-38 (1992) (explaining how prisoners’
dilemma games and zero-sum games provide insights about relative wealth levels of
women and men).
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Feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon has

Men’s physiology defines most sports, their needs define auto and
health insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies
define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their
perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their
experiences and obsessions define merit, their objectification of life
defines art, their military service defines citizenship, their presence
defines family, their inability to get along with each other—their
wars and rulerships—defines history, their image defines god, and
their genitals define sex.18

Men have defined key copyright concepts such as “authorship,”
“protectability,” “infringement,” and all of the other precepts, terms,
and conditions of copyright law. As will be explained below, it is
highly probable that there are gendered differences in the ways that
copyright laws benefit and burden everyone affected by copyright laws
and practices, including authors, intermediaries (such as editors,
publishers, and distributors), and consumers. The strictures of
copyright law are undoubtedly experienced differently by discrete
groups of women, as are the benefits and opportunities of copyright
protections. Both women and men are extremely diverse within their
respective genders and essentializing people strictly by gender can be
deeply problematic.19 Nevertheless, reflection upon whether gender
biases may be embedded in copyright laws and policies is both useful
and necessary, even if initial forays into this complicated terrain
require a somewhat unrealistically essentializing, gender-dualist
approach.
Considerations of gender issues in the structure and application of
copyright law will not displace other sorts of policy analyses, but
rather enhance them. Evaluation of the gendered implications of
copyright issues can be integrated into a wide variety of ongoing
scholarly inquiries.
Because authorship, intermediation, and
consumption are fluid and overlapping constructs, copyright laws
affect many individuals in multiple ways. Gender is only one variable,
but it is an important and largely immutable characteristic inherently
present in any copyright circumstance that bears independent
scrutiny.

18. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance: On Sex
Discrimination, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 81, 84
(Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne Kennedy eds., 1991).
19. See, e.g., Culture Cat, Essentialism: Draft of 3W Encyclopedia Entry, Aug. 7,
2004, http://culturecat.net/node/essentialism (describing how broad essentialist
views of “natural” gender roles premised on biological difference reinforce harmful
sex stereotypes and hierarchies).
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II. FAIR USE, FAIRNESS, AND GENDER
The current model of U.S. copyright law, within which the
copyrights in creative works can be characterized as pieces of saleable
“property,” is a masculine construct. Certain kinds of works, those
best suited for industrialized commoditization, have been heavily
propertized through a symbiotic blend of copyright and contract law
precepts, while other forms of arts and crafts, those that have been
relegated to the domestic realm, are less often the subject of rigorous
copyright protections or restrictions. Categories of works specifically
enumerated in the Copyright Act are described very generally, and
they are open-ended by design.20 Specific works that receive powerful
copyright protections from the courts are typically those that have
been broadly commercially exploited. This is because the copyrights
in monetarily valuable works are most likely to be deemed by their
owners worthy of “protection” through infringement litigation, which
can be lengthy and expensive. The fact that the plaintiff works in
copyright infringement suits tend to be culturally visible may lead to a
perception that the more remunerative a work, the more extensively
protected its copyrights are.
People who create things for
noncommercial purposes may feel that copyright law has nothing
positive to offer them. Though their works may be inherently vested
with robust incipient copyright protections, without the will or ability
to fund the legal activity necessary to enforce these copyrights, it may
seem as if copyright protections barely exist at all.
For some authors, copyright law impacts them chiefly by making
them vulnerable to allegations of infringing copying.
As a
consequence, the copyrights of others affect their creative lives more
than their own copyrights.21 “Fair use,” the legal doctrine allowing
unlicensed, non-permissive uses of copyrighted works,22 is therefore
critically important. It is the friction-reducing statutory construct by
which, at least in theory, copyrighted materials can be used without
engaging in sometimes onerous quests to obtain permissions,
negotiate commercial transactions, or remit licensing fees. As a
shelter from the buffeting copyright claims of others, fair use may be
more important to noncommercial creators than it is to profit seeking
entities.

20. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2005) (stating that copyright
protection vests in tangible original authored works, including musical, pictorial, and
literary works, but does not extend to original ideas embodied in the works).
21. See MCLEOD, supra note 5, at 142 (discussing the growing trend of
corporations suing artists for the use of culturally iconic trademarks in music or art).
22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (stating that the fair use of copyrighted works for
purposes including teaching and news reporting will not constitute infringement).
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Fair use liberates authors to fairly copy, adapt, or embed portions of
pre-existing content into their own new creative endeavors. Fair use
enables intermediaries to fairly develop new content delivery models
and distributive technologies without incurring secondary liability.
Consumers utilize fair use when they fairly make noncommercial
backup or auxiliary copies of copyrighted works they have purchased
or use them in a way that might otherwise infringe one or more of the
exclusive rights held by copyright owners.23
One can only avail herself of fair use by using fairly, which limits
and complicates the doctrine, but encompasses considerations far
more expansive than commercialization and monetary exchange. To
the extent that women and men may construe fairness differently, the
definition of fair use is susceptible to gendered shadings. Fair use
determinations invoke ethical and moral considerations, which many
observers believe are influenced by gender.24
The cultural gendering of fair use is observable when, for example,
a representative of the Recording Industry of America asserts about
peer-to-peer music uploading and downloading: “I don’t think your
mother had in mind this kind of sharing.”25 Good mothers,
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (establishing the exclusive rights of a copyright owner,
which include the exclusive rights to reproduce, distribute, and publicly perform or
display the copyrighted work).
24. Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Ethics, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
(2003), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-ethics/ (citing Alison M. Jaggar,
Feminist Ethics, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 363-64 (Lawrence C. Becker & Charlotte
B. Becker eds., 1992)).
Among others, feminist philosopher Alison Jaggar faults traditional western
ethics for failing women in five related ways. First, it shows little concern for
women's as opposed to men's interests and rights. Second, it dismisses as
morally uninteresting the problems that arise in the so-called private world,
the realm in which women cook, clean, and care for the young, the old, and
the sick. Third, it suggests that, on the average, women are not as morally
developed as men. Fourth, it overvalues culturally masculine traits like
independence, autonomy, separation, mind, reason, culture, transcendence,
war, and death, and undervalues culturally feminine traits like
interdependence, community, connection, body, emotion, nature,
immanence, peace, and life. Fifth, and finally, it favors culturally masculine
ways of moral reasoning that emphasize rules, universality, and impartiality
over culturally feminine ways of moral reasoning that emphasize
relationships, particularity, and partiality.
Id.; see also CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT Voice 105 (1982) (suggesting that the
concepts of goodness and care are central to women’s construction of morality); EvaMaria Schwickert, Gender, Morality, and Ethics of Responsibility: Complementing
Teleological and Deontological Ethics, HYPATIA, Spring 2005, at 164, 165-70
(evaluating theories on gender differences in the construction of moralities).
25. Brock Read, Industry Executives and Copyright Activists Debate File Sharing
at a Cornell U. Colloquium, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 29, 2005, at A30 (“Mr.
Sherman acknowledged that recording studios have struggled to convince college
students that piracy is unethical . . . ‘We’ve clearly lost the vocabulary war, because it's
called file sharing, which sounds wonderful,’ he said. ‘But I don't think your mother
had in mind this kind of sharing.’”).
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according to the view implicit in this comment, establish a moral
paradigm of intellectual property use by their children that does not
encompass putatively infringing behaviors.26 Why the comment
references “mothers” rather than “parents” suggests that the speaker
sees women as important arbiters of copyrights and “copywrongs.”27
Generalizations about divergences between the views and behaviors
of women and men are of limited utility, and they risk assuming either
too much difference or similarity between the sexes, as well as too
much uniformity within them.
Some aspects of discernible
difference, however, are reasonably the subject of data-generating
empirical research. Relevant “authorship” data, for example, would
include information about gender differences in terms of the number
of authors who create independently and are initially vested with
ownership of their copyrights versus the number of authors who
create under “work for hire” status and, therefore, never own or
control copyrights in their works unless awarded these rights by
contract.28
The relationships of gender to rates of creative
productivity, inclinations toward artistic collaboration, income levels,
and professional status would also be of interest. Gendered statistics
with respect to the numbers of commercial creative works that are
produced in various media, and the levels of commercial success these
works achieve, would be useful and informative as well. Little data on
this subject is currently available.
There is, however, both anecdotal and empirical evidence about
gendered differences in authorship that is available in many
individual contexts. One only need open a typical newspaper to see
that women, who comprise over half of the U.S. population,29 are
significantly underrepresented as content providers on the Op-Ed
26. But see Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, in PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON
THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 25, 30-37, 40-41 (1994)
(describing “Mom,” who makes sacrifices for the common good by favoring greater
joint utility over individual wealth maximization, as the “heroine” of various group
thought experiments).
27. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 13 (emphasizing the existence of
“copyrights” and “copywrongs”).
28. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)
(noting that § 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 provides that a work for hire is: (1) a
work prepared by an employee within the scope of employment or (2) a work
ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work).
29. See U.S. Census Bureau, Population Pyramid Summary for United States,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html (last visited July 26, 2006) (recording
that women made up fifty-one percent of the U.S. population in 2000 and showing
population distribution of males and females among different age ranges); see also
infoplease.com, Ratio Of Males To Females, By Age Group, 1950–2004, http://www.
infoplease.com/ipa/A0800439.html (last visited July 26, 2006) (indicating that over
the past fifty years there averaged ninety-six males per one hundred females in the
United States).
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pages,30 on the comics pages,31 and in most other authorship
contexts throughout the publication.32 While this might not mean
that women write less than men do, it certainly suggests that their
works are published and distributed less often and, therefore,
“consumed” less as a result. Lack of publication opportunities
certainly might dishearten and disincentivize female authors.33
The Guerilla Girls, a group of anonymous feminist artists, once
publicized a poster that asked, “Do women have to be naked to get
into the Met Museum?” and noted that less than five percent of the
modern artists shown at New York City’s Metropolitan Museum of Art
were female but more than eighty-five percent of the humans
depicted nude in the displayed artwork were women.34 Again, this
statistic does not necessarily mean that women produce fewer quality
paintings, but it does indicate that their works are less frequently
displayed in prestigious venues and are therefore less successful by
many traditional measures. This, in turn, might decrease incentives
for women to take up painting, sculpture, and other visual arts as
fields of study from which to launch careers.
30. See Women Still Infrequently Called Upon For Policy, Public Affairs TV
Debates, MEDIA REP. TO WOMEN, Winter 2002, http://www.mediareporttowomen.com
/issues/301.htm (reporting on the absence of women’s voices and opinions in public
policy discussions on influential Sunday morning public-affairs talk shows); see also
Katha Pollitt, Invisible Women, THE NATION, Apr. 4, 2005, available at http://
www.thenation.com/doc/20050404/pollitt (complaining that the many talented and
outspoken female pundits are invisible to op-ed editors, who publish almost
exclusively male columnists and bemoan the lack of female talent).
31. See Trina Robbins, Gender Differences in Comics, Image & Narrative, Sept.
2002, http://www.imageandnarrative.be/gender/trinarobbins.htm (noting that
mainstream comic artists, almost all male, depict extremely over-sexualized female
characters, and the small number of female comic artists, published by mainly by
independent presses, depict women in a more realistic fashion); see also Jack
Glascock & Catherine Preston-Schreck, Gender and Racial Stereotypes in Daily
Newspaper Comics: A Time-Honored Tradition?, 51 SEX ROLES 423, 428-430 (2004)
(asserting that a lack of female representation ‘behind the scenes’ has had a negative
impact on depictions of women on television and in printed advertisements). But see
Jackie Estrada & Elayne Riggs, Women Doing Comics, FRIENDS OF LULU, May 25,
2004, http://www.friends-lulu.org/wdc.html (compiling a list of women active in the
designing and publishing of comics).
32. See Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting, Media Advisory “Women’s Opinions
Also Missing on Television-Women of Color Virtually Invisible on Sunday Shows”
(Mar. 24, 2005), http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2473; Bob Papper, Running in
Place-Minorities and Women in Television See Little Change, While Minorities Fare
Worse in Radio, COMMUNICATOR, July-Aug. 2005, at 26-32, available at
http://www.rtnda .org/news/2005/071105.shtml; see generally Laura Flanders, REAL
MAJORITY, MEDIA MINORITY: THE COSTS OF SIDELINING WOMEN IN REPORTING (1997).
33. See Pollitt, supra note 30 (noting that few major news publications employ
female columnists, who represent only one out of the nineteen pundits in the
Washington Post and are completely absent from Time, where all eleven columnists
are male).
34. See Jeffrey Toobin, Girls Behaving Badly, THE NEW YORKER, May 30, 2005, at
34 (discussing the formation of a feminist artist collective to promote women in the
arts).
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Information about intermediaries that would be relevant to a
gendered analysis of copyright law would similarly track variables such
as income levels, productivity, professional status, and commercial
success. The ratio of female to male executives with decision-making
power in all manner of media companies and arts organizations
would be of interest, as would a gender-differentiated analysis of the
creative and commercial decisions that are made. Such data would
shed light on whether female executives are more, less, or equally as
likely as men to favor, promote, and aggressively protect the works of
other women.
Pertinent data about consumers would focus on gendered
differences in purchases and usage of goods and services that derive
their primary value from copyrighted works.35
Ascertainable
differences by gender in the quantity and form in which music
purchases are made, for example, might suggest that women and men
are not equally interested in commercially produced and distributed
music.36 On average, women may prefer to obtain or access music
through different mechanisms than men. For example, one gender
may download songs in greater numbers than the other.37 There may
be gender differences with respect to radio listening habits. Research
might (or might not) demonstrate that women and men are not
35. Contrasted with goods or services in which copyrighted works are used to
create an artificial monopoly that burdens rather than helps consumers. See Press
Release, Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Frontier Foundation Defends
Printer Cartridge Co.: Opposes Printer Manufacturer's Broad Copyright Claims (July
2, 2003) http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/Lexmark_v_Static_Control/?f=20030702_
eff_pr.html (using copyright as way to prevent use of refillable and/or competing
printer toner cartridges); see also LawGeek, http://lawgeek.typepad.com/lawgeek
/2004/08/skylink_wins_fe.html (Aug. 31, 2004) (commenting on a case wherein the
plaintiff used copyright to attempt to prevent competitor’s replacement remote
control from working with garage door opener); Jacqueline Lipton, The Law of
Unintended Consequences: The Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
Interoperability, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 490 (2005) (examining corporate
attempts to use the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to prevent competitors from
incorporating a product’s copyrighted software into replacement parts for that
product).
36. See generally TV Tunes Top Mobile Ringtone Poll, BBC NEWS , July 2, 2004,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/entertainment/music/3859929.stm (“Women made up
more than half the 5.9 million people who downloaded a ringtone to their phone in
the three months up to June”); Lucy Sheriff, Are Women Safer Surfers Than Men?,
THE REGISTER, Aug. 26, 2005, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/26/
women_men_safe_surfing/print.html (revealing the results of a telephone poll which
concluded that online scams and viruses effect men more than women); Posting of
Keith Stuart to gamesblog, http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/games/archives/2005/06/
15/mobile_gaming_more_popular_with_women_than_men.html (June 15, 2005,
15:35 EST) (noting the results of surveys across Europe and the United States which
concluded that women play more games on their mobile phones than men).
37. See, e.g., Natalie Hanman, Music To Her Ears, GUARDIAN UNLIMITED, May 6,
2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/features/story/0,,1477648,00.html (discussing the
divide in online purchases of music between women, who purchase only four percent
of downloaded music, and men, who purchase ninety-six percent).
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equally law-abiding when it comes to copyright and instead there is a
gendered divergence with respect to copyright infringement.
If there are measurable and significant differences in the ways in
which copyright laws affect women and men, questions then arise
about how the disparate impacts should be addressed. Few people are
likely to expect or want Congress to amend the copyright laws in
order to provide two different sets of rights and restraints, one for
women and the other for men. If the copyright laws as currently
written and applied result in gendered imparity, a recalibration of the
laws so that they more closely approach gender neutrality is probably
the optimal solution, and feminist legal theory provides an important
framework upon which less gendered copyright laws could be
constructed.
III. FEMINISM AND COPYRIGHT LAW
There are many links between copyright laws and women’s lives
that bear examination. Consider the fact that until 1979, copyright
protection was effectively unavailable for pornographic movies.38 To
the extent that copyright protections truly become incentives for the
creation of new works, one consequence of judicial determinations
that obscene works were entitled to copyright protection was to spark
the production of more of them.39
The possibilities that
pornography, and especially violent and misogynistic pornography,
might directly or indirectly hurt some women was not discussed, nor
was the possibility that the plentiful supply of pornography geared
towards the sexual desires of men might lead to a distorted view of
women’s sexual needs and the expected sexual behavior of women.40
38. See Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 865
(5th Cir. 1979) (holding it was improper to permit the assertion of obscenity as an
affirmative defense to a copyright infringement claim). First, the court concluded
that nothing in the 1909 Copyright Act indicated that obscene materials could not be
copyrighted. Id. at 854-58. Second, the Act was constitutional under the necessary
and proper clause even though it accorded protection to works that arguably did not
promote “science and useful arts” under the Copyright Clause. Id. at 858-60. Finally,
the court held it was improper to apply the equitable unclean hands doctrine in
contravention of the Act’s pro-creativity purposes. Id. at 861-66.; see also Jartech, Inc.
v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1982) (deciding that taking pictures of
copyrighted adult movies for nuisance abatement proceedings was fair use and
therefore not copyright infringement).
39. See Kurt L. Schmalz, Problems in Giving Obscenity Copyright Protection: Did
Jartech and Mitchell Brothers Go Too Far?, 36 VAND. L. REV. 403, 403-04 (1983)
(tracing the history of copyright protection for obscene works and stating that the
Mitchell Brothers and Jartech courts failed to recognize that giving copyright
protection to obscenity violates federal obscenity laws).
40. See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993) (advocating that
the United States must balance free speech concerns against pornography, which the
author considers hate speech that degrades women and furthers the victimization of
women).
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This article takes no position on whether these cases were correctly
decided but notes that if the increased incentives to produce
pornography were considered at all by the legal decision makers
involved, they were apparently deemed outside the scope of relevant
or appropriate copyright law considerations. The relevant court
opinions frame the issue of copyrightability of pornography in a
gender-neutral manner, as a freedom of speech issue.
Assuming there are significant quantitative and qualitative
differences in the impact that copyright laws have upon women and
men, there are many possible perspectives one can take on gendered
aspects of copyright law, if it is viewed through a multifaceted feminist
lens. A few are listed below.
A. Should the Explicit Substantive Coverage of
Copyright Law be Expanded?
If copyright laws do not adequately value women’s creative work, it
may mean that the laws themselves should be amended, expanding
existing protections so that additional categories of creative works are
clearly accorded copyrightability. This assumes that copyrightability
will enhance creativity and the distribution of creative works in a way
that is favorable to the greater good of women.
Women who fail to fully commercialize their creative works may
lose income. The impact of commercialization upon the control they
have over their works is a bit more complicated, as commercialization
usually requires an author to relinquish all control over her copyrights
or ownership of the actual copyrights themselves. Women who
manage to retain ownership of their copyrights, but do not
aggressively police unauthorized uses of their copyrighted works, may
lose both income and a measure of control over their works. All of
this is true for men as well, but there may be gendered differences
with respect to the number of female versus male authors who are
realistically able to commercialize, control, and protect their creative
works. Portions of any detectable disparities may be attributable to
the nature and form of the works themselves, rather than the sex of
the authors, but there also may be gendered differences in the
mediums through which women and men creatively express
themselves. If women are disproportionately disadvantaged by too
little copyright protection for particular types of creative works,
application of feminist principles would suggest that copyright laws
need to be amended to create copyright parity between the genders.
Expanding copyright coverage might then be envisioned as
“leveling the playing field.” However, this assumes that, substantively
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as well as rhetorically, after the playing field is “re-graded,” women
ought to be out competing equally with men in a game contrived by
men that has objectives and governing rules devised by men and is
refereed by men. In this respect at least, an expansionist or
maximalist position on copyright scope can be characterized as
contrary to some of the values of feminism.
B. Should The Application of Existing Copyright Law Be Altered?
Certain copyright use and access restrictions may not mesh well
with culturally significant roles and activities of women. Copyright
protections constructively impose complicated formalities, such as
licensing and permission procedures, that generate uncertainty and
transaction costs, which can complicate creative productivity and the
distribution and end uses of copyrighted works. If female authors,
intermediaries, or consumers are disproportionately inhibited by
copyright law strictures or have less access to competent legal advice
and assistance, feminism would propose that the ways in which
copyrights are applied or enforced by the courts should be altered in
ways that better facilitate actualization of the goals of the copyright
system with respect to women.
One specific, complicated, and interesting question is whether
female authors are disproportionately burdened, or benefited, by the
relative absence of legal formalities that must be complied with in
order to secure a valid and protectable copyright. At one time, the
procedural requirements for securing and maintaining full copyright
protection for a newly created work required an aspiring copyright
holder to comply with somewhat complicated copyright notice,
deposit, registration, and recordation of transfers and licenses
provisions.41 The Copyright Act of 1976 and subsequent Berne
Convention Implementation Act of 1988 significantly reduced
formalities,42 vesting works created on or after January 1978 with
copyright protections at the moment they are completed,43 and
eliminating the notice requirement as of March 1989.44 Though U.S.
41. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1909) (delineating, for example,
classifications for the types of work which must be specified on a copyright
application, authors who are qualified to apply for copyrights, and the duration,
renewal, and extension provisions); see also U.S. Copyright Office, How to Investigate
the Copyright Status of a Work, COPYRIGHT INFORMATION CIRCULAR 22, Dec. 2004,
available at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ22.html (instructing how to
approach a copyright investigation and how to search copyright records).
42. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-412 (2006) (describing the primary formalities in the
Copyright Act).
43. See id. § 302(a) (stating that the copyright begins at the creation of the work
and extends for seventy years after the author’s death).
44. See id. §§ 401-406 (codifying the form of notice, position of notice, and
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residents must register copyrighted works in order to bring copyright
infringement suits,45 registration can be virtually coterminous with
the filing of the pertinent complaint and supporting documents.46
This diminution of formalities, particularly the elimination of the
notice requirement, has been vigorously criticized47 because it has
effectively created a presumption that everything that is potentially
copyrightable is copyright protected. The absence of copyright notice
on a work no longer communicates anything meaningful on the
subject of the copyright status of the work or about who holds the
rights. This makes it more difficult to ascertain whether a particular
work actually is copyrighted, what the scope of the copyright might
be, and who needs to be contacted if licenses or permissions are to be
obtained.
Authors without ready access to lawyers and copyright-licensing
legal machinery are arguably disadvantaged the most by this relatively
new paradigm. Simply discerning whether a work that an author
might like to copy, adapt, or borrow from is copyrighted now requires
a fair amount of research, even before factors such as its availability
and desirability are ascertained.48 Freeing initial authors from the
evidentiary weight of notice for visually perceptible copies, phonorecords of sound
recordings, and publications incorporating works of the United States Government
up to the effective date of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988).
45. See id. § 411 (requiring that an action for copyright infringement cannot be
made until pre-registration or registration of the copyright has been made and that
where a deposit, application, and fee for registration have been delivered but
registration refused, the applicant may still institute a copyright infringement action if
notice and a copy of the complaint is served to the Register of Copyrights).
46. See id. § 412 (noting that a copyright owner cannot generally recover
statutory damages or attorney's fees where the copyright has not been registered
prior to the occurrence of the infringement).
47. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 13 (arguing that digital copyrighting requires
Internet viewers to pay for their sights and sounds, and that this may eventually create
a collision between what people regard as their freedom of expression and these
copyright protections); see also Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57
STAN. L. REV. 485, 528-39 (2004) (tracing the history of copyright formalities from the
U.S. Constitution through the modern Copyright Act which the author argues is
becoming increasingly unconstitutional due to the relaxing of formalities).
48. See U.S. Copyright Office, supra note 41.
There are several ways to investigate whether a work is under copyright
protection and, if so, the facts of the copyright. These are the main ones: (1)
Examine a copy of the work for such elements as a copyright notice, place
and date of publication, author and publisher. If the work is a sound
recording, examine the disk, tape cartridge, or cassette in which the recorded
sound is fixed, or the album cover, sleeve, or container in which the
recording is sold. (2) Make a search of the Copyright Office catalogs and
other records; or (3) Have the Copyright Office make a search for you . . .
Copyright investigations often involve more than one of these methods. Even
if you follow all three approaches, the results may not be conclusive.
Moreover, as explained in this circular, the changes brought about under the
Copyright Act of 1976, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988,
the Copyright Renewal Act of 1992, and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
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burdens of complying with formalities thus exacerbates copyright
complexities for downstream transformative users.
On the other hand, the reduction in copyright formalities has made
obtaining a defensible copyright an almost paperwork-free
endeavor.49 Though copyright protection remains unavailable for
works that are not “fixed in any tangible medium of expression,”50 at
least the reduction in formalities has made holding copyrights more
accessible to authors who resist, or are logistically excluded from,
forms of property ownership that require written titles and deeds and
attorneys to draft and process them.
Before the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect on January 1, 1978,
“publication” of a work was required before it was eligible for
copyright protection,51 copyright formalities were complicated, and
the penalties for failing to correctly comply with them were severe.52
To the extent that women were culturally deemed less worthy of
literacy and providing them with higher education was seen as
wasteful, the process for obtaining and preserving copyrights must
have seemed especially difficult and somewhat intimidating to a
female author who may have had to struggle momentously simply to
convince an intermediary that the work was even worthy of
Extension Act of 1998 must be considered when investigating the copyright
status of a work. This circular offers some practical guidance on what to look
for if you are making a copyright investigation. It is important to realize,
however, that this circular contains only general information and that there
are a number of exceptions to the principles outlined here. In many cases it
is important to consult with a copyright attorney before reaching any
conclusions regarding the copyright status of a work.
Id.
49. See 17 U.S.C. § 407 (2000) (requiring the “owner of copyright or of the
exclusive right of publication in a work published in the United States” to deposit
copies of the work in the U.S. Copyright Office within three months of the date of
publication); see also id. § 106(3) (authorizing the owner of a copyrighted work “to
distribute copies or phonorecords of a copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending”).
50. Id. at § 102(a).
51. See Peter B. Hirtle, Copyright Term and the Public Domain in the U.S. (Jan.
1, 2006), http://www.copyright.cornell.edu/training/Hirtle_Public_Domain.htm
(charting the copyright terms for various published and unpublished works).
52. See id.
[I]n investigating the copyright status of works first published before January
1, 1978, the most important thing to look for is the notice of copyright. As a
general rule under the previous law, copyright protection was lost
permanently if the notice was omitted from the first authorized published
edition of a work or if it appeared in the wrong form or position. The form
and position of the copyright notice for various types of works were specified
in the copyright statute. Some courts were liberal in overlooking relatively
minor departures from the statutory requirements, but a basic failure to
comply with the notice provisions forfeited copyright protection and put the
work into the public domain in this country.
Id.
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publication, no less copyright protection.
C. Should Women Increasingly “Commodify” Their Creative Output
Through Current Copyright Law?
Alternatively, if one starts with an assumption that the copyright
laws cannot or should not be changed or differently applied, one
must conclude that women should behave more like men and aspire
to be treated more like men. Such “masculinization” might enable
women to benefit more fully from copyright laws as creators and to
obtain equality of access as consumers of creative works. It would also
concomitantly expand the realm of copyright by increasing the
commoditization of previously collaboratively taught and practiced
skills and the commoditization of copyrights in creative works that
had previously been functionally (if not technically) part of the public
domain. The strand of feminism that views sameness, identical
behavior, and identical treatment as the preferred embodiment of
equality between the genders might favor this approach. Difference
feminists, however, would question any normative reforms that did
not value, preserve, and advance the unique creative endeavors of
women, if the forms of expression and modes of distribution were
freely chosen.
IV. INJECTING GENDER AND FEMINISM INTO
THE CULTURAL COPYRIGHT DISCOURSE
Gender-linked reluctance to aggressively protect copyrights may be
related to the double bind articulated by scholars such as Margaret
Jane Radin and Marilyn Frye: there are few options for subordinated
people and all of them suborn, censure, or exact penalties.53 Men
contrived copyright law to facilitate commerce in creative endeavors.
If they had equal opportunities to participate in financially
remunerative creation and distribution of copyrighted works, one can
only speculate about whether women would be equally enamored of
the current level of commoditization as the men in control of the
government and the content industries. Women might expand or
contract the reach of copyright protections and the scope of fair use,
or they might leave one or both as they are.54
53. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1699, 1699-1704 (1990) (describing the dual problem of the commodification of
women as one where if women are prohibited from marketing their sexual services it
threatens the personhood of these women but if they are allowed, the personhood of
the woman becomes a commodity); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO
FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 9 (2d ed. 2003).
54. See generally Stephen L. Carter, Commentary: Custom, Adjudication, and
Petrushevsky’s Watch: Some Notes From the Intellectual Property Front, 78 VA. L.
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Real life experiences of women vary because of differences in race,
income level, religion, ethnicity, physical ability, and sexual
orientation. Therefore, articulation of one overarching feminist
philosophy of copyright law that meets with universal or even
substantial acceptance is probably unrealistic.
While asserting
anything definitive about feminism is potentially an act of great
hubris, it is the claim of this author that low barriers protection is the
correct feminist position on copyrights. Those who already hold such
philosophical positions about copyright without having consciously
considered the gendered aspects of copyright doctrine and practice
may be surprised, hopefully pleasantly, to learn they hold
fundamentally feminist views about copyright law and that the
methods and teachings of feminist legal theory can be integrated into
their ongoing scholarly pursuits.
The low barriers approach to copyright law assumes that both
individual creators and society will largely benefit from a conservative
construction of copyright protection that facilitates a significant
amount of unauthorized excerpting, adapting, and sampling by
declining to deem it infringing. Any lost royalties or licensing fees of
copyright holders are presumed offset by the quantity and variety of
new creative works that are made possible by the enhanced
accessibility of existing works.
Below is an overview of some the ways in which women could reap
advantages from lowered copyright barriers. The analysis separates
women into three categories in which copyright laws and people
intersect: as authors, intermediaries, and consumers.
A. Women as Authors
Copyright laws form the frame within which a commercial
marketplace for creative works is stitched. Copyrights “protect” the
creative works of authors regardless of the author’s gender at the
initial level of analysis. Even during the historical interval in which
women where prohibited from owning “real” property,55 women
REV. 129 (1992) (discussing the fair use doctrine and questioning whether it is
appropriate that individual courts decide what constitutes fair use, thereby removing
an individual’s right to exclude).
55. See Jim Garamone, The Changing Nature of Equality, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, June 27, 2002, http://www.dod.mil/news/Jun2002/
n06272002_200206277.html (discussing the changing nature of women’s rights from
the signing of the Declaration of Independence through the civil rights struggles of
the 1960s and 1970s); see also Donna Przecha, Finding Female Ancestors,
GENEALOGY.COM, http:// www.genealogy.com/50_donna.html (last visited July 26,
2006) (recommending ways of searching for female ancestors that take into account
the difficulties that stem from women’s social and legal status through history);
Reader’s Companion to American History: Married Women’s Property Acts,
http://college.hmco.com/history/readerscomp/rcah/html/ah_056700_marriedwo
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could legally hold copyrights in the works they authored. However,
their ability to enter into contracts related to those copyrights for the
purposes of assigning or exploiting the works was limited.56 Since
copyright laws have always been primarily designed to facilitate
commerce, this rendered a woman’s copyright power little more than
a right of attribution to the extent that she was unable to make and
enforce her own publication and distribution arrangements. In
addition, any wealth that the copyrights generated would have
become the property of her husband, if she had one, or possibly come
under the control of a male relative if she was unmarried.57
men.htm (last visited July 26, 2006) (examining the gradual reversal of laws that
disallowed married women from holding, buying, or selling property, suing or being
sued, entering into contracts, or retaining wages); Law Library of Congress, Married
Women’s Property Laws, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awlaw3/
property_law.html (last visited July 26, 2006) (exploring the history of women’s rights
in the United States and giving examples of language from various Acts in the United
States concerning women’s rights); Jone Johnson Lewis, Married Women’s Property
Act: 1848 New York State, http://womenshistory.about.com/od/married
womensproperty/a/property_1848ny.htm (last visited July 26, 2006) (providing the
language of the New York Married Women’s Property Act of 1848, which allowed the
women of New York the right to own property separate from their husbands, and
receive rents and gifts).
56. Cf. Pamela J. Smith, Part I - Romantic Paternalism - The Ties That Bind Also
Free: Revealing the Contours of Judicial Affinity for White Women, 3 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 107, 112-13 (1999) (arguing that while the law has recently been liberating for
women, it has come with a price similar to the price that white women historically
paid under romantic paternalism, creating limitations and restrictions through
judicial affinity).
57. See CAROL M. ROSE, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, in
PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF
OWNERSHIP 233, 245-47 (1994); see also Richard H. Chused, Family (Proper)ty, 1
Green Bag 2d 121, 123-24 (1998) (stating that the married women’s property acts
were not created as a recognition of wives’ rights to control property and be
independent economic actors, but rather as debtor protection against the creditors of
the husband, therefore the statutes did little to change the rights of husbands to
control family accounts and their wives’ wages); Richard H. Chused, History’s Double
Edge: A Comment on Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 Geo. L.J. 2213, 221418 (1994) (discussing the historical relationship between family law and property law
and noting that any wealth acquired by a woman in a marriage was generally
attributable to the husband upon divorce proceedings); Richard H. Chused, Married
Women’s Property Law: 1900-1850, 71 Geo L.J. 1359, 1359-61 (1983) (using case law,
archival records, and legislative materials to analyze the causes of the women’s
property acts and to determine that the early acts only made minor changes to laws
relating to women, which conformed to, rather than confronted, the domestic roles
of women at that time); Richard H. Chused, History’s Double Edge: A Comment on
Modernization of Marital Status Law, 82 Geo. L.J. 2213, 2214-18 (1994) (discussing
the historical relationship between family law and property law and noting that any
wealth acquired by a women in a marriage was attributable to the husband upon
divorce proceedings); David H. Bromfield, Book Review, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1109, 1110
(1987) (stating that while historians traditionally characterize the married women’s
property acts as an effect of the economic changes that accompanied
industrialization, the reviewed book argues that it was the ideological and social
forces that gave women increased autonomy through these reforms); James W. Ely,
Jr., Book Review, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 294, 296 (1983) (maintaining that the common
law rules before the married women’s property acts made wives economically
dependent and legally invisible).
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The primary focus of modern copyright law remains on the
regulation of commercial transactions involving creative works, and
the interests of women are assumed to be coterminous with those of
men.58 Women working in creative fields suffer from gender
discrimination (as they do in most disciplines), which likely results in
depressed employment opportunities and lowered salaries. While it is
clear that female authors who produce creative content in direct
competition with men can make parallel use of the copyright
industrial complex, despite potentially receiving a smaller amount of
monetary compensation for their efforts, it is less clear that copyright
protections are as readily available for more traditionally feminine
creative arts. The copyright laws seem to assume that certain types of
creative works within the domestic sphere are either not appropriately
creative or that they should not be subject to monopolistic control.
Section 102 of the Copyright Act sets out the following categories of
copyrightable works: literary works, musical works, including any
accompanying words, dramatic works, including any accompanying
music, pantomimes and choreographic works, pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works, motion pictures and other audiovisual works, sound
recordings, and architectural works.59
It then explicitly lists
uncopyrightable categories of works, stating, “In no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”60
Many of the creative works located within the domestic sphere have
traditionally been excluded from copyright protections, such as
cooking recipes, food preparation methods, sewing techniques, and
knitting and crocheting procedures.61 While doctrinally they might
strike one as more appropriately being the subjects of patents, patents
are expensive to apply for, take a long time to issue, and would be
difficult to enforce if they were being infringed in the relative privacy
of individual homes.
Even before the United States eliminated formalities altogether as a
prerequisite for copyright protection,62 copyrights were much faster
and easier to obtain than patents, which is at least partly the reason
58. See Wright, supra note 5, at 71 (discussing the limitations of copyright
protection to what is considered high art through patriarchal legislation).
59. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006).
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
61. See, e.g., LITMAN, supra note 13; Pollack, supra notes 14 and 17.
62. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept.
28, 1979, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 (requiring no formalities for copyright protection).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol14/iss3/4

22

Bartow: Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and Copyright Law

2006]

FAIR USE AND THE FAIRER SEX

573

the software industry pursued and obtained copyright protection for
computer programs and user interfaces.63 Copyright laws were not
originally designed or intended to protect works like the code that
drives computer software, but they were instrumentally deemed to do
so when continued incentivizing of this category of works appeared to
require the development of some sort of monopoly–generating legal
tools of control and exclusion.64
Like computer software, extant copyright law poorly accommodates
some stereotypically feminine art forms. Quilting, for example, is not
a good fit with intellectual property constructs.65 Quilting is not
typically recognized as an art form because a quilt is often the product
not of a solitary individual, but rather of an indefinite group, such as a
“Stitch and Bitch”66 (or the more suitably gentile “Batting and
Chatting”67) quilting club, where, at each monthly meeting, the
entire membership works on one member’s quilting project and
many finished quilts feature the repetitive use of traditional designs68
or designs derived from natural objects.69 And though they are
63. See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 45 (1979), available at http://www.digital-law-online.info/CONTU
/PDF/index.html (laying out the National Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works’ findings on how to address computers and copy machines in
the Copyright Act of 1976).
64. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L. J. 663,
694 (discussing the revision process of the copyright statutes in the United States and
noting that in 1980 Congress adopted the CONTU recommendations to make
computer programs in machine-readable form copyrightable).
65. See Wright, supra note 5, at 90-94, 96 (describing the decisions, which denied
protection to women's sewing craft productions and noting the marginalization of
women under the myth of an artist as a romantic hero); cf. Posting of Laurie Finke,
director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program, Kenyon College, to students
of her Women’s Studies 111 Class (Fall 2004), Paper #1: Gender Norm Violation,
http://www2.kenyon.edu/Depts/WMNS/Courses/Syllabus/violation.htm (last visited
July 26, 2006) (assigning students to act in violation to their gender roles, for
example: girls should open doors for boys, and boys should carry purses).
66. See, e.g., Stitch And Bitch Café, http://www.sewfastseweasy.com/stitch
_and_bitch/index.php (last visited July 26, 2006) (providing a forum for bloggers to
discuss current fashion, swap sewing patterns, and chat in groups online); In a Minute
Ago, http://inaminuteago.com/blog/ (last visited July 26, 2006) (allowing quilters to
swap sewing patterns and project ideas with one another over the Internet).
67. See Bernard Herman,Q.S.O.S. Interviews with Quiltmakers: Catherine
Whalen, CENTER FOR THE QUILT ONLINE, May 26, 2003, http://www.centerforther
quilt.org/qsos/show_interview.php?pbd=qsos-a0a2h5-a (relaying information about
Catherine Whalen’s quilts and her Batting and Chatting Quilting Group where
people share their projects with each other, building upon, and interpreting, each
others ideas in order to design new quilts).
68. See Catherine Whalen, Q.S.O.S. Interviews with Quiltmakers: Ginny Smith,
CENTER FOR THE QUILT ONLINE, Apr. 4, 2003, http://www.centerforthequilt.org/
qsos/show_interview.php?pbd=qsos-a0a4d1-a (describing a quilt Ginny Smith made
which was based on a traditional log cabin design).
69. See Herman, supra note 67 (discussing a quilt Catherine Whalen made based
on an abstract vision of her rose garden).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006

23

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 14, Iss. 3 [2006], Art. 4

574

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 14:3

sometimes turned into decorative wall hangings, quilts are ordinarily
used quite mundanely on beds in private homes. They are not
something to drop quotes from in conversation or to display publicly
as if they were paintings or work of sculptures. In fact, one is well
advised not to display a quilt publicly if, for example, a depiction of
Mickey Mouse has somehow been incorporated into the design
without the permission of the aggressively litigious Disney Company.70
Studies of the demographics of Internet web logging have found
that women are slightly more likely than males to create web logs
(“blogs”).71 In some respects, group blogs offer a text-based
cyberspace homology to quilting.72 Though most are contrived to
allow authorship indicia for each individual posting, it is together that
the postings form the useful whole. Individual blogs may in turn form
intersecting web circles, an image that is evocative of a common
quilting pattern. They may retain indicia of individual authorship but
these features are often credited to a pseudonym rather than the
actual author’s legal name. As a general matter copyright law does
not easily accommodate collaborative, creative online endeavors.73
Consequently, it is unlikely that the promise of protectable copyrights
incentivizes such projects.
One might think that cooking recipes are certainly adequately
creative to be copyrighted, given the very low thresholds of originality
and creativity that are required in order for a work to be deemed

70. See Charles S. Sara, Protect Your Corporate Intellectual Property Position,
BIOTACTICS IN ACTION, Nov. 1998, http://www.biotactics.com/Newsletter/v1i6/IP1
.htm (relaying that a daycare center in Wisconsin, which commissioned an artist to
paint Disney characters on its walls, was forced by Disney to paint over the mural at its
own expense because the daycare used the copyrighted Disney characters without
permission); Daycare Center Murals (Dec. 29, 1996), http://www.snopes.com/disney
/wdco/daycare.htm (discussing a situation where Disney forced daycares in Florida to
remove images of Disney characters painted on the daycare walls).
71. See Perseus Blog Survey, http://www.perseus.com/blogsurvey/theBlogging
Iceberg.html#demographics (last visited July 26, 2006) (noting that “[f]emales are
slightly more likely than males to create blogs, accounting for 56.0% of hosted
blogs”); see also SUSAN C. HERRING, INNA KOUPER, LOIS ANN SCHEIDT & ELIJAH L.
WRIGHT, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTION OF WEBLOGS
(2004), http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/women_and_children.html (noting
that quantitative studies show as many or more female blog authors than male, yet
discourse about blogs in the media, scholarly communication, and in the blogs
themselves tend to disproportionately feature male bloggers).
72. See, e.g., Alliance for American Quilts, Quilters’ S.O.S. – Save Our Stories,
CENTER FOR THE QUILT ONLINE, http://www.centerforthequilt.org/qsos/qsos.html
(offering a place for quilters to tell their stories, view pictures of quilts, and share
designs online).
73. See Margaret Chon, New Wine Bursting from Old Bottles: Collaborative
Internet Art, Joint Works, and Entrepreneurship, 75 OR. L. REV. 257, 257-58 (1996)
(suggesting that "typical authorship practices" in digital network-based computer
environments create doctrinal problems in current copyright law regarding joint
works).
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copyrightable.74 However, recipes do not unambiguously ascend to
lofty heights of copyrightability until they are collected into a
cookbook, which handily enough is also a marketable as well as
copyrightable commodity.75 Commentary at the U.S. Copyright
Office’s web site notes:
A mere listing of ingredients is not protected under copyright law.
However, where a recipe or formula is accompanied by substantial
literary expression in the form of an explanation or directions, or
when there is a collection of recipes as in a cookbook, there may be
a basis for copyright protection. Note that if you have secret
ingredients to a recipe that you do not wish to be revealed, you
should not submit your recipe for registration, because applications
and deposit copies are public records.76

Though the distribution of sewing patterns tends to be somewhat
commercial and monetized online, as it is in real space, the free
sharing of recipes over the Internet is quite common and, as an
anecdotal matter, many of those offering recipes are female.77 Some
recipe sites feature corporate sponsorship and large amounts of
advertising, while others contain exhaustive lists of foods in
noncommercial formats, thereby facilitating public interest oriented
information exchanges.78 Still other recipe web sites appear to be
74. See Steven S. Boyd, Deriving Originality in Derivative Works: Considering the
Quantum of Originality Needed to Attain Copyright Protection in a Derivative Work,
40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 325, 335 (2000) (explaining that courts only require
copyright holders to demonstrate a minimal level of creativity in order to maintain a
copyright).
75. See
U.S.
Copyright
Office,
What
Does
Copyright
Protect?,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-protect.html#what_protect (last visited July
26, 2006) (indicating that copyright law does not protect “mere” recipes).
76. See id. (highlighting the factors necessary to receive copyright protection for
original work).
77. See Sewing Patterns, http://www.sewingpatterns.com (last visited July 26,
2006) (highlighting the various sewing and clothing patterns for sale on the
Internet); see also McCall Pattern Company, http://www.mccall.com (last visited July
26, 2006) (providing a search index allowing for the sale of clothing patterns);
Simplicity, http://www.simplicity.com (last visited July 26, 2006) (selling clothing
patterns for items ranging from wedding dresses to pillows); Folkwear,
http://www.folkwear.com (last visited July 26, 2006) (providing, for charge, clothing
patterns for vintage and ethnic clothing); Stretch and Sew, Inc., https://
www.gmidesign.com/stretch/home.html (last visited July 26, 2006) (listing clothing
patterns and other accessories available for sale). But see Free Sewing Patterns and
Sewing Machine Help at AllCrafts!, http://www.allcrafts.net/sewing.htm#freeprojects
(last visited July 26, 2006) (offering free sewing patterns to anyone who wishes to
obtain them); Sundancers, Wild Women and DreamWeavers, http://wildwomen.
typepad.com (last visited July 26, 2006) (explaining various methods for creating
fabric and other crafts).
78. See, e.g., Kraft Foods, http://www.kraftfoods.com/kf/ (last visited July 26,
2006) (making recipes available though Kraft Foods sponsorship); All Recipes,
http://www.allrecipes.com/ (last visited July 26, 2006) (providing free recipes while
raising revenue through the use of advertisements from sources such as Weight
Watchers and USA Today); Food Network, http://www.foodtv.com/ (last visited July
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largely created for the amusement of the authors, such as “Knifewielding Feminists,”79 which is subtitled, “A recipe spot for feminist
foodies.” 80
There is a high degree of sharing of advice and instruction in
knitting communities as well, both on and offline.81 Freely available
instructions and patterns for sweaters, scarves, socks, and other
knittable goods are legion.
Most, but not all, online yarn
manipulators are women. One male web ring participant slyly calls
his blog, “When Knitting Was a Manly Art.”82
Some female bloggers organize or support collaborative craft
projects. One wonderful example is “A Month of Softies,” which is an
open group craft project facilitated by Loobylu, the personal web site
of Claire Robertson, an illustrator and mother from the suburbs of
Melbourne, Australia.83 Participants create works that embody the
monthly theme, such as monsters or flowers, and then arrange to have
pictures of their contributions posted at the Loobylu web site, along
with instructions for replicating them.84 Contributors effectively
donate aspects of their creative output to everyone who accesses their
Month of Softies material.85
If women are less likely to consider themselves copyright-holding
26, 2006) (providing recipes through Food TV sponsorship); RecipeSource,
http://www.recipesource.com/ (last visited July 26, 2006) (listing free recipes from
countries all over the world as submitted by site visitors); CopyKat Creations,
http://www.copykat.com/ (last visited July 26, 2006) (highlighting free viewersubmitted recipes for popular restaurant dishes).
79. See Knife-Wielding Feminists, http://feministfoodies.blogspot.com/ (last
visited July 26, 2006) (providing a place where like-minded people can share recipes).
80. See id. (explaining uses for various foods and creating new recipes for the
enjoyment of bloggers posting on this site).
81. See Knitty, http://www.knitty.com/ISSUEspring05/index.html (last visited
July 26, 2006) (publishing a quarterly collection of knitting patterns); see also
Another Knitting Blog, http://mimoknits.typepad.com/ (last visited July 26, 2006)
(blogging about knitting and ongoing knitting projects by anonymous posters);
Wendy Knits, http://wendyknits.net/ (last visited July 26, 2006) (describing her
knitting projects on her weblog and making recommendations to readers with regard
to completing their own projects); The Rittenhouse Review, http://rittenhouse.
blogspot.com/2003/12/knitting-memories-or-memories-of.html (Dec. 30, 2003)
(publishing a letter from the blogger’s mother, in which she described learning to
knit in grammar school); Posting of Teresa Nielson Hayden to Making Lights,
http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/004342.html#004342 (Dec. 28,
2003) (describing a newspaper article and emphasizing the benefits of knitting).
82. See When Knitting was a Manly Art, http://www.gaiser.org/knitblog/ (last
visited July 26, 2006) (posting about knitting issues and other daily events).
83. See A Month of Softies, http://www.loobylu.com/softies/about.html (last
visited July 26, 2006) (explaining that the authors created the website to institute a
monthly craft project through which any knitting enthusiast, from anywhere in the
world, could become involved).
84. See, e.g., id. (describing the July 2005 theme of knitting sock monkeys).
85. See id. (explaining the sock monkey project and freely providing resources to
other participants in order to help them create sock monkeys).
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authors or to demand formalized “credit” for their creative works than
men, this suggests gendered differences with respect to the degree to
which copyright protections are sought and enforced. To the extent
that people who are unlikely to assert copyrights can be characterized
as more giving and generous people, this designation might apply to
more women than men.86 If it did, this would suggest that any
quantitative evidence that women hold fewer copyrights than men
could be a consequence of a gendered rejection of copyright
formalism, rather than a result of lesser creative productivity by
women.87
Celebrating the reluctance of some women to own and control
their creative output may mean conterminously affirming the qualities
and characteristics of female powerlessness. Copyright law was
designed to facilitate the commoditization and exploitation of
creative works, and gender-related reluctance to stake rigorous
copyright claims hinders women authors professionally and
economically.
Women’s subordinate status, and the disadvantages that flow from
it, is often ascribed to choices women make themselves, purportedly
freely. One feminist scholar noted about organized sports:
Sexism, which is what we are discussing here, often justifies itself by
assuming that women don’t want the thing that is being denied
them. Before Title IX, which opened up high school and college
athletics to women, the common wisdom was that girls didn’t like
sports—girls weren’t competitive, they were weak (remember girls’
basketball?), they didn’t like to get sweaty and dirty, they feared
being hurt, they were always getting their periods. Once the
opportunities were there—thanks to the women’s movement, not
to gym teachers promising to keep an eye out for talented female
players—girls turned out in droves. Now we see girls even in
quintessentially masculine sports like soccer and rugby. Today

86. Cf. Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, 78 VA.
L. REV. 421, 428-29 (1992) (explaining how prisoners' dilemma and zero-sum games
provide insights about relative wealth levels of women and men); see also Carol M.
Rose, Bargaining and Gender, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 547, 548-62 (1995)
(applying bargaining games to explain the different allocation of assets across gender
in terms of real or culturally perceived differences in preferences for cooperative
strategic behavior).
87. Cf. J.E. Bedi, Innovative Lives: Exploring the History of Women Inventors,
SMITHSONIAN INST., Mar. 3, 2005, http://invention.smithsonian.org/centerpieces
/ilives/womeninventors.html (recognizing that the role of women in the home
contributed to the limitation of patents granted to women); Mary Bellis, Mary Kies –
Patenting Pioneer, http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blkeis.htm (last
visited July 26, 2006) (indicating that Mary Kies was the first woman to obtain her own
patent in the United States, despite the difficulties of female property ownership in
the early 1800s).
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nobody says girls are shrinking violets on the playing field.88

In a similar vein, women may not be choosing to relinquish control
over their creative endeavors because it may not be available to be
relinquished. If the works they author are works for hire or judged
unsuitable for commercialization, the unavailability of royalties is
hardly something that has been chosen voluntarily.
A classic double bind emerges. Female authors risk accusations of
selfishness and greed if they violate perceived gender-linked social
norms of sharing, caring, and selfless collaboration because they seek
to procure and enforce individual authorship rights and attributive
credit.89 However, women who adhere to collaborative norms and
decline to rigorously anoint themselves “sole authors” or to hold and
enforce the full panoply of copyright based exclusive rights forgo
attribution, income, and control. Before the equality litigation activity
of the 1970s and the legislative changes that followed, women were
often restricted by laws that sought to “protect” them from the
conflicts that copyright protections can engender, and the possibility
that copyright laws have a similar destructively paternalistic aspect
bears consideration.
B. Women as Intermediaries
Women tend to have less powerful intermediation roles in creative
fields than men. Men largely control of the large media companies,
though there are certainly a few visible exceptions, such as Oprah
Winfrey. Creative industry sectors such as publishing, film, television,
theater, art dealing, and the music business are also dominated and
controlled by men. Consequently, it is predominantly men who
choose the content that will be commercialized and the quantity of
resources that will be expended to promote individual works.
Decisions about how aggressively to “protect” copyrights, such as when
to bring infringement suits and how zealously to pursue them are
largely made by men as well.
Women may need to adopt male views and strategies to succeed in
male-dominated intermediation roles. Many corporate intermediaries
are perfectly happy to sell to and profit from women but generally do
88. See Posting of Katha Pollitt to Political Animal, http://www.
washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2005_03/005908.php (Mar. 22, 2005)
(arguing that men keep women from entering into certain fields by claiming that
women would not want to do the task in question, thus limiting the ability of women
to gain a foothold in male-dominated areas).
89. See Roberta Kwall, Authors – Stories: Narrative’s Implications for Moral
Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S.C. L. Rev. 1 (2001); see, e.g.,
Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (1991) (reviewing Taylor’s claim of joint
authorship); Thompson v. Larson. 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir 1998) (litigating the right to
joint authorship credit for the Broadway musical Rent).
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not want to closely identify with female interests, unless it is part of a
successful marketing strategy. Artworks by women command less
revenue and attention than those by men, so profit and reputationminded art dealers might try to elude becoming known as a “woman’s
gallery.” Colloquially, this phenomenon might be expressed as
“avoiding girl germs.” Galleries that specialize in women’s works
would probably be characterized as “niche” because successful female
artists are rare, despite the majority status of women in the population
at large.
Romance novels, however, seem to benefit from apparent female
authorship, regardless of the author’s actual gender. Pseudonyms
appearing on romance novel covers are usually female and, generally,
very Anglo and aristocratic sounding, such as Victoria Aldridge, Ellyn
Bache, Elizabeth Bailey, Daphne Clair, Jacqueline Diamond, Olivia
Gates, Jillian Hart, Tara Taylor Quinn, Roxanne Rustand, Carol
Stephenson, Meredith Webber, and Rebecca Winters.90
Some categories of romance novels have a marked tendency to
offer the same basic plot lines over and over to an extent that one
might expect copyright law to discourage or prevent. Yet it almost
seems as though certain romance novel publishers have chosen to
either risk or forgo copyright infringement suits premised upon the
doctrine of substantial similarity.91 If it is true that West Side Story
would infringe the copyright of “Romeo and Juliet” if that
Shakespearian play was currently protected by a U.S. copyright92 and
if the appropriation of a few notes from a copyrighted song without
permission for sampling purposes is widely viewed as actionable,93
one would think that some of the more repetitive romance novels
90. See eHarlequin.com, http://www.eharlequin.com/cms/index,jhtml (last
visited July 26, 2006) (providing access to romance novel authors through a site-based
search engine); see also Lucy Monroe’s List of Author Web Pages,
http://www.lucymonroe.com/authorwebpages.htm (last visited July 26. 2006)
(providing links to new romance authors and touting their work); Wilma Slaight,
Carolyn Heilbrun, WELLESLEY COLLEGE ARCHIVES, June 26, 2000, http://www.wellesley
.edu/Anniversary/heilbrun.html (describing feminist literary theorist Carolyn
Heilbrun, who penned mystery novels under the name Amanda Cross to hide her
identity before she obtained tenure at Columbia University).
91. See ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN
COPYRIGHT LAW (2003).
92. See MELVIN B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)
(Matthew Bender & Co. 1985) (arguing that West Side Story and Shakespeare’s
“Romeo and Juliet” are very similar stories for the purposes of copyright law).
93. See Ivan Hoffman, Fair Use: Music Sampling, http://www.ivanhoffman.com/
fairusemusic.html (recommending that people always seek licenses for fair use of
musical material in order to ensure complete compliance with copyright laws); see
also Posting of Kevin Heller to Tech Law Advisor, http://techlawadvisor.com
/2004/09/music-sampling-question.html (Sept. 28, 2004) (advising that people
obtain licenses before copying even a minimal amount of music from a song
recording).
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would be routinely enjoined by copyright-holding competitors.
However, copyright suits do not appear to be a significant part of the
ostentatiously satin and lace fabric of this sector of the romance novel
publishing industry.
In the very different context of relatively noncommercial web
logging, women authors affirmatively act as intermediaries to advance
the cause of sisterhood. Female web loggers (“bloggers”) often link to
each other to subvert the dominant link paradigm, which
overwhelmingly favors male bloggers and to blogroll and highlight
each other’s blogs to promote mutual visibility.94 This is an example
of authors taking on the work of intermediaries because traditional
mechanisms have failed them.
C. Women as Consumers
Copyright laws allow, but do not reward, the sharing of useful
information and creative techniques by authors, assuming they either
retain or do not claim “ownership” of copyrights in their own
creations. The copyright laws largely oppose the sharing of the works
of others without authorization by and monetary compensation to
copyright holders. Large copyright-holding entities have had a great
deal of success recasting any acts of copying, especially of digital
works, as presumptive copyright infringement. Relatively recent high
barriers copyright developments have adversely effected many cultural
institutions, such as depleting the collections of public libraries.95
This has a disproportionate impact on females, because women are
the primary users of public libraries.96
While it may be fine and even laudable to share a loaf of bread,
regardless of whether it is home-baked or purchased from a
commercial bakery, it may not be acceptable as a matter of copyright
law to generously share music, movies, or books if they are digital and
have been licensed or encoded with a digital rights management
94. See, e.g., Pen-Elayne on the Web, http://elayneriggs.blogspot.com
/2005/03/estrogen-month-day-20-its-sundayand.html (Mar. 20, 2005) (linking to
several female bloggers as a way to promote women on the web); The Countess,
http://trishwilson.typepad.com/blog/2005/03/subvert_the_dom_1.html (Mar. 28,
2005) (recommending approximately twenty weblogs written exclusively by women);
Utopian Hell, http://www.utopianhell.com/resources/ (last visited July 26, 2006)
(providing links to other feminist blogs and other resources).
95. See Ann Bartow, Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More
Like a Book, 48 VILL. L. REV. 13, 96 (2003) (indicating that digitalized books make
public libraries nervous due to the fear that publishers will not work with libraries to
make such content available to library consumers).
96. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Women in the Web of Secondary Copyright Liability
and Internet Filtering, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 449, 462-63 (2005) (explaining that women
constitute the majority of library patrons to highlight the lack of legal scholarship for
gender issues available online).
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(DRM) device. The norms of sharing works with one’s friends and
family are undermined or disabled by DRM technologies. The very
concept of sharing copyrighted works is being socially recast as
infringement, especially if copying is involved, even as a potential
matter.97 While it may be a longstanding norm for a woman to loan
books to her friends or DVDs to a parent who is unexpectedly
homebound with a sick child, technical changes enforced by new
legal regimes such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act make
once generous, selfless seeming acts technologically impossible or
legally risky.
Copyright ownership fosters and relies on dominance over
consumers. Women consume many types of creative content at
higher rates than men. For example, women purchase and read
more works of fiction than men.98 Consider again the romance
novel. There are different types of romance novels, and many
romance novels are rich, complicated works of fiction, as intricate,
sophisticated, and valuable as any other category of literature. These
tend to be single-titled romances, lengthier works which are released
individually, and not as part of a numbered series.99 Though often
dismissed as inconsequential or frivolous, it is difficult to understand
why they are more or less socially important than westerns, political
thrillers, spy sagas, or books about sports figures.100
97. See generally STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD 38-78
(Cambridge University Press 2004) (explaining how society creates a norm and the
means by which people in that society must recognize the norm).
98. See Anastasia Niehof, Final Paper, Judging Books and Readers by Their
Covers: An Examination of the Intersections of Gender and Readers’ Advisory (May 7,
2003), http://mingo.info-science.uiowa.edu/~niehof/genderra.htm (recognizing
that while women constitute the majority of romance novel readers, most women do
not necessarily read romance novels).
99. See A Romance Review, The Social Significance of the Romance Novel, http:
//www.aromancereview.com/columns/theromancenovelparttwo.phtml (last visited
July 26, 2006) (recognizing the difference between single-title romance novels and
numbered series, both economically and with readers).
100. See, e.g., TANIA MODLESKI, LOVING WITH A VENGEANCE: MASS-PRODUCED
FANTASIES FOR WOMEN 11-15 (1982) (indicating that society views popular female
literature, such as romance novels, in a burdensome and unfair light, despite the fact
that male-based literature can often read more poorly, even if viewed more highly);
JANICE RADWAY, READING THE ROMANCE: WOMEN, PATRIARCHY, AND POPULAR LITERATURE
8-10 (P. Steiner et al. eds., UNC Press 1984) (criticizing romance novel critics for
treating consumers in a condescending manner by indicating that romance novels
have no value); PAMELA REGIS, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE ROMANCE NOVEL 11-16
(2003); Cora Kaplan, The Thorn Birds: Fiction, Fantasy, Femininity, in SEA CHANGES:
ESSAYS ON CULTURE AND FEMINISM 117, 145-46 (1986) (recommending that rather than
criticize romance novels for feminist issues, critics should analyze the political impact
of romance novel fantasies); LAURIE LANGBAUER, WOMEN AND ROMANCE: THE
CONSOLATIONS OF GENDER IN THE ENGLISH NOVEL 17-20 (1990) (explaining that critics
often determine the definition of a novel by distinguishing it from a romance);
CAROL THURSTON, THE ROMANCE REVOLUTION: EROTIC NOVELS FOR WOMEN AND THE
QUEST FOR A NEW SOCIAL IDENTITY 3 (1987) (recognizing that while American women
of all ages and backgrounds read romance novels, the mass media rarely takes notice
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There is, however, a subcategory of pulpy, formulaic romance
novels, which illustrates an odd intersection between copyrights and
gendered book consumption.101 Their intended and actual audience
is overwhelmingly female.102 Sometimes referred to as “bodice
rippers,” these books, often available through monthly subscriptions,
feature stereotypical characters, repetitive plotting, and sexual
contacts of borderline consensuality.103 They are often written under
somewhat pretentious-sounding pseudonyms and graced with cover
art depicting an attractive, well-dressed, heterosexual couple in some
sort of romantic embrace. One observer noted:
Typically, the heroine is removed from her familiar surroundings,
usually associated with a fairly comfortable background in
childhood or family. She meets an aristocratic man whose advances
she initially rejects because she believes he has only a sexual interest
in her. Thus she is typically antagonistic towards him. Then the
intermediate intervention occurs. Typically, heroine and hero
become separated in some way. This makes possible an eventual
reversal of the initial rejection and antagonism. The hero typically
displays an act of tenderness which is not fully explained at this
juncture, but provides the opportunity for a gradual reinterpretation of the hero’s initial behaviour. Eventually, the hero
declares his love for the heroine and they are happily reconciled.104

The successful monthly pulp romance repeatedly tells its readers
the same essential story: regardless of contrary initial impressions,
of the highly profitable industry); JANICE RADWAY, The Readers and Their Romances,
in FEMINISMS 574, 576 (Robyn R. Warhol & Diane Price Herndl eds., 2d ed. 1997)
(suggesting that analysts cannot simply review a selection of romance novels and then
hypothesize as to the cultural impact on society created by the romance novel).
101. See A Romance Review, supra note 99.
Romance fiction critics claim that romance novels are all formulaic
pornography for women. Elaine Wethington, a sociologist with an interest in
popular cultural studies, believes that instead of finding fault with the
formulaic qualities of category romances we should examine whether
publishers pressure romance authors to conform to a formula because of
what they write. To a certain extent, series romances are formulaic because
of the guidelines developed by publishers. Is it sexism that makes the novels
formulaic or the author’s plot devices?
Id.
102. See Women and Media: On Soaps and Media Reception (Feb. 10, 2000)
http://courseweb.edteched.uottawa.ca/cmn3104/soaps.htm (citing Harlequin’s
1990 annual report which concluded that the average Harlequin readers are
“overwhelmingly women of whom [forty-four percent] work at least part-time . . .
range in age from [twenty-two to forty-nine], average family income of [fifteen to
twenty thousand dollars], high school diploma but haven’t completed college”).
103. See id. (recognizing that “‘series or ‘category’ romances [are] short romances
that are released in numerical order on a monthly basis, with a series number on each
title”).
104. See Reception Studies: Romantic Fiction, Janice Radway: Reading the
Romance (June 21, 2003), http://www.cultsock.ndirect.co.uk/MUHome/cshtml/
media/radway.html (explaining the basic makeup of a serial romance novel).
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beneath distant and foreboding exteriors, the men who pursue them
romantically are decent, caring people who are worthy of being loved
by female protagonists and by the readers themselves.
Both
reinforcement of idealized heterosexual relationships and perceived
market imperatives may drive publishers’ content decisions. Serial
romance novel consumers can only buy, or refrain from buying, the
books that contain the content that distributors choose to provide.
Copyright law seems to do a poor job of incentivizing originality in
this context, and one consequence may be that a patriarchal status
quo is effectively reinforced.
CONCLUSION
Copyright laws allocate control over and distribution of resources
generated by creative works. They help determine whether, and to
what extent, those who produce creative works reap the rewards of
this production, the role of intermediaries in the distribution of
creative works, and the goods and options that will be available to
consumers.
The ways in which male-constructed and male-enforced copyright
laws disadvantage women have not been discussed very much in
intellectual property legal scholarship. One obvious explanation for
this is that gendered aspects of copyright laws are viewed as secondary
to other economic and social considerations. Consequently, an
important goal of this article is to convince the reader that gender
issues should be part of the primary copyright discourse and that
fundamental fairness in the copyright context is not strictly a matter
of money.
There is a very visceral double bind posed to the author by writing
this article: pointing out the dearth of gender analysis in existing
copyright scholarship written by women may (incorrectly) make it
appear as though the author is criticizing female intellectual property
scholars for accidentally overlooking or intentionally avoiding
something important, or, as applicable, of being “inadequately
feminist.” Many women have done extremely important work in the
intellectual property field, and it is not at all the intention of this work
to diminish their accomplishments in the least. Drawing attention to
the lack of scholarship on gender issues in male-authored copyright
scholarship may provoke defensive questions about why more women
are not engaging in it or accusations that this article is giving short
shrift to those who are. No censure of anyone is intended for any
reason. This author has intentionally minimized the quantity and
moderated the stridency of her gender-related scholarship for
instrumental career reasons and is in no position to criticize any
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similar choices made by others. The point of this exercise is simply to
encourage increased consideration of gender issues in the legal
copyright scholarship of the future.
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